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Abstract–This paper revisits the theoretical literature on the policy process and 
examines how it has informed recent trade policy development in Uganda. Drawing 
from in-depth interviews with 120 actors from government and non-government 
agencies and institutions working on trade related issues, the paper maps out the 
entry points for different institutions, including women-owned organisations in the 
policy processes; and examines whether institutions outside government matter for 
trade policy in Uganda. The findings underscore significant attempts to involve 
several stakeholders in the policy processes, but finds that their chance to influence 
policies is limited. Political interests, and the country’s commitments to international 
agreements, determine trade policy decisions. It further shows that although the 
national machinery for trade policy consultation and formulation has made some in-
roads in ensuring the participation of women, in practice the point of entry for women 
organizations falls outside key points of influence in the policy process. The gender 
balance of the institutions at the centre and those on the periphery of the policy 
process largely favours men. The findings also points out the institutional and 
analytical gaps which need to be bridged if gender-issues are to be mainstreamed in 
trade policy making.  
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1 Introduction  
 
Uganda has come a long way since the 1960s, in the area of public policy, from a 
highly interventionist regime with widespread control on trade, to a substantially 
liberalized economic framework. The first two decades after independence were 
characterized by state ownership of the means of production using polices such as 
the 1968 Common Man’s Charter (CMC), the 1970 Nakivubo pronouncement, and 
the 1972 expropriation of assets and businesses of foreign investors which were 
steps towards nationalization of private properties. All these resulted into a 
significant decline in the industrial and commercial sectors. Active government’s 
involvement in economic management was seen to be the only way to address 
problem of underdevelopment and poverty. Over the past twenty years, however, 
there has been an important shift toward free market economy. In fact, the 
government has implemented one of the farthest reaching programs of economic 
liberalisation known in Africa, and the policymaking process has changed. This 
paper explores how the existing theories of trade policy process have informed this 
recent trade policy development in Uganda.  
 
Until the late 1980s, Uganda government used tariffs and non-tariff barriers with 
import substitution extensively, to protect state enterprises and infant industries 
from what was perceived as ‘unfair’ competition from cheap imports. State 
enterprises enjoyed monopoly power in agricultural marketing and input 
distribution, as government maintained price control and subsidies to protect 
agricultural sector and promote trade in export-oriented commodities such as 
coffee, cotton, tea, and tobacco.1  
 
In May 1987, the new government of President Museveni embarked on an 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP), under the auspicious of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and structural adjustment policies, in which 
liberalisation of foreign trade and privatisation of state enterprises were part. These 
reforms have, over the last 15 years, led to the restoration of macroeconomic 
stability and high economic growth of 5-7% per annum in the 1990s and an 
average growth of 5% per annum since 2000. During the decade of the 1990s, 
Uganda attained one of the highest per capita real GDP growth rates in the 
world—of 3.4 percent, twice the 1.7 percent for all developing countries. Partly, 
because of the strong economic growth, the poverty incidence fell dramatically, 
from 56 percent in 1992/93 to 38 percent in 2002/03. Uganda’s share in world 
exports increased from 0.006 percent to 0.007 percent, between 1990–92 and 
2002–2004. The macroeconomic stability has also contributed to business 
confidence and a relatively favorable investment climate, and has also managed to 
attract significant investment from industrialized and emerging economies e.g. 
China, India. 
  
While these major trade liberalization episodes resulted in significant reduction 
in trade barriers, including tariffs and non-tariff measures, regulatory and 
administrative measures as well as regulations governing establishment of 
businesses, the impact on informality has been more limited. The increase in 
informal trade, the share of the workforce employed in the informal sector and the 
contribution of informal economy to national income over the last two decades has 
                                                 
TP
1
PT Some examples in transport industry include Uganda Railways, Uganda Airlines, Uganda Transporters 
Corporation. 
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led some to believe that intensified foreign competition could be contributing to the 
rise in informality. Over 80 percent of businesses in Uganda are 'informal,' 
operating outside the regulatory structure of the state. Informal agricultural trade 
accounts for about 65 percent of the volume of trade, but only 22 percent of the 
value. This level of informality creates a challenge to policy-driven efforts to 
develop the private sector, create jobs and sustain economic growth. 
 
In addition, the gender dimension of informal trade is a primary concern. Cross-
border informal trade involving commodities such as beans, cattle, cotton, hides 
and skins, kales, oil crops, oranges, maize and salt as well as temporary migration 
of traders have important gender considerations as women make up the majority of 
informal workers and, in some places, informal traders. 
 
This study focuses on policy process, but also considers informal trade. What is 
needed is to examine this relationship (between trade and informality) in a much 
more detailed manner—to estimate the effects of trade reforms on informality. 
However, we choose in this paper to start from the need to develop a better 
understanding of the manner in which government policies get formulated and 
implemented, what determines the strength of forces driving policy change, as well 
as the effects of those forces on trade and informality; and how policy makers are 
accordingly concerned with catering to the interest of actors in the informal 
economy.  
 
Objectives 
 
The overall objective of this paper is to revisit the theoretical literature on the policy 
process and examines how it has informed recent trade policy development in 
Uganda. Drawing from existing literature and in-depth interviews with 120 actors 
from government and non-government agencies and institutions working on trade-
related issues, the paper set to 
(i) provide overview of relevant theory policy theories and their application to 
various aspects of the policy process; 
(ii) discuss the various processes by which trade policy is made in Uganda—
Who is involved in the trade policy process and at what stage?. To what 
extent, are the processes informed by the existing theories of trade policy 
process? Why are some economic interests better able to impose their 
preferences on trade policy than others? 
(iii) map out the entry points for women and women’s organisations in the 
trade policy processes in Uganda. Are women entrepreneurs, traders, 
farmers, workers and consumers included in trade policy formulation, 
consultation and implementation? What is the gender balance of the 
institutions at the centre and those on the periphery of the policy process? 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the trade policy 
reform, and provides brief profile of Uganda’s foreign trade. Section 3 presents 
overview of a range of theories and approaches in the study of the policy 
process—and their application to various aspects of the policy process discussed 
in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes with some broad policy implications.   
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2 Trade policy reform 
 
2.1 Overview  
 
The NRM Government of President Museveni embarked on a wide-ranging 
reforms beginning May 1987, with Economic Recovery Program (ERP)—with 
support of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)—and one of the 
farthest reaching programs of structural adjustment known in Africa. In some 
instances, the country moved the process faster than expected by IMF and the 
World Bank.  Domestic price controls and state control of marketing arrangements 
were abolished (in 1989) and monopoly powers of Coffee Marketing Board (CMB), 
Lint Marketing Board (LMB) and Produce Marketing Board (PMB) were accordingly 
removed. The preferential treatments or trade privileges enjoyed by state 
enterprises and co-operatives were removed. Private sector participants were 
allowed to compete with the public sector and cooperatives in buying, selling, and 
ginning seed cotton. Import and export procedures, including streamlining 
procedure, reduction of administrative ‘red tape’, ‘adjusting’ the licensing 
requirements and replacing import controls (quantitative restrictions) with tariff-
based protection (tariff equivalents), the reduction in the range of tariff bans as well 
as the reduction in the overall level of tariffs and the avoidance of excessive 
protection. The temporary export stabilization tax on coffee exports was removed, 
and tariff and tax incentives, were introduced to encourage private investment. 
  
Alongside liberalisation, government pursued privatisation of state enterprises, 
and introduced the investment Code 1991 as it sought to improve investment 
environment and reverse long-standing antipathy towards foreign investment. 
 
As a result of the Uruguay Round, Uganda’s level of tariff bindings increased 
significantly to cover a quarter of all tariff lines i.e. 87 percent of agricultural and 
fishery products and 15 percent of industrial products (www.wto.org). These 
bindings are within a ceiling of 40 and 80 per cent. In the service sector, Uganda’s 
specific commitments governing market access and national treatment are 
primarily in the area of tourism. No exemptions from most favoured nation 
treatment have been noted in the Uruguay Round Schedule. 
 
2.2 International commitments  
 
2.2.1 Multilateral agreements  
In October 1962, Uganda became a GATT contracting party under the trade 
"succession" procedures acquiring the GATT rights and obligations previously 
accruing to the United Kingdom with respect to its territory.  On 29th September 
1994, Uganda ratified the Marrakech Agreement to become a founding member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO is a membership institution, 
established on 1 January 1995. It comprises 144 nation states. The WTO provides 
the legal and institutional foundation of multilateral trading system, and the 
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principal contractual obligations that determine the framework for and 
implementation of domestic trade. 
  
In addition, WTO is the main institution through which trade relations among 
nations evolve, and is the primary institution empowered to enforce and implement 
global economic governance. The WTO is responsible for facilitating negotiations, 
implementation and operation of the multilateral trade agreements; providing a 
forum for further negotiations; administering the Dispute Settlement; monitoring 
compliance of member states through the implementation of the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanisms; and cooperate with the World Bank and the IMF to achieve 
greater coherence in economic policy making. 
 
Uganda subscribes to a number of commitments under WTO, e.g. the binding 
arbitration of investment disputes scheme under the WTO protocol. New WTO 
rules and disciplines may result in legislative changes especially in areas such as 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures, safeguards and customs valuation. 
The government is already in the process of incorporating the new WTO 
commitments into domestic legislation, to cover intellectual property protection and 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). The creation of WTO has 
transformed the management of world trade by promoting a shift from trade 
liberalization based on tariff concessions to domestic polices, institutions practice 
and regulations. Second, it has changed the character of negotiations from a focus 
on bargaining over products to negotiations over policies that shape the condition 
of competition since it expanded the scope of issues to include services, 
investments, intellectual property rights and environment and development. Third, 
WTO has transformed management of world trade by promoting policy 
harmonization and cohesion across countries regardless of their levels of 
development. 
 
2.2.2 Regional trade arrangements 
 
Uganda is a founding member of the East African Community, with Kenya and 
Tanzania. Uganda and Kenya are members of COMESA, while Tanzania is a 
member of the South African Development Community (SADC).  Since COMESA 
and SADC intend to form customs unions in the medium-term which will mean 
introducing their own CETs, it remains to be seen how goods from Tanzania will be 
treated in Uganda and Kenya.  
 
Uganda is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) which, in December 1994, replaced the Preferential Trade Area for 
Eastern and Southern African States (PTA). The COMESA Treaty, signed by over 
20 African States, commit member states towards intensifying co-operation in 
customs management, including simplification and harmonization of customs 
formalities and trade documents, the adoption of a uniform tariff classification and 
establishment of a standard system of customs valuation (Articles 63, 64, 69). 
Initially, this was to lead to creation of a free-trade area by 2000, a customs union 
by 2004 and, eventually, and economic and monetary union. Members have also 
agreed to reinforce cooperation in such areas as customs procedures, 
standardization, anti-dumping and countervailing measures, competition policy, 
capital movements, and prevention of smuggling. 
In addition to the EAC and COMESA, Uganda is a member of other regional 
initiatives such as the Great Lakes Region, the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI), and 
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IGARD and the newly created African Union (AU)–a successor of the Organization 
of the African Unity (OAU).  
 
2.3 Trade policy and export performance 
 
Uganda has significantly liberalized its market since the mid-1990s, with its 
weighted average tariffs falling below those in several comparator groups (Table 
1). Prior to the actualisation of the East African Community (EAC) Customs Union  
and adopting the Common External Tariff (CET) in January 2005, Uganda had one 
of the most liberal trade regimes amongst developing countries, with tariff levels 
actually close to those in developed countries (and even lower in agriculture).  With 
adoption of the CET, however, Uganda had to raise the levels of tariffs to match 
that of its partner states. 
 
Table 1. Uganda and Worldwide Trends in Tariff Protection  
  (Weighted averages, in percentage) 
 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Group 1994 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Uganda  16.82 7.28 7.07 6.64 6.22 13.49 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Products 17.25 2.49 2.81 3.07 3.89 11.06 
Mineral Commodities 9.25 6.41 5.56 6.89 6.06 4.43 
Manufactured Commodities 18.48 8.11 8.16 6.74 6.66 18.59 
Manufactured Commodities not identified by type 15.62 7.04 6.91 6.66 5.99 11.07 
Least Developed Countries 67.17 15.58 13.47 13.02 12.21 10.92 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Products 37.84 5.80 6.63 6.36 6.50 10.12 
Mineral Commodities 52.35 18.77 12.33 11.68 11.63 3.25 
Manufactured Commodities 77.07 18.35 16.25 15.50 14.39 14.16 
Manufactured Commodities not identified by type 65.61 14.11 12.09 11.73 11.10 10.04 
Sub-Saharan Africa  18.25 16.33 14.03 11.01 7.12 6.52 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Products 8.36 14.10 8.23 12.35 8.24 8.90 
Mineral Commodities 16.11 20.96 11.35 7.74 1.91 1.08 
Manufactured Commodities 17.99 17.90 16.15 11.59 9.79 9.65 
Manufactured Commodities not identified by type 19.94 14.43 13.85 11.19 7.14 6.52 
Developed Countries 6.40 2.83 2.87 3.48 2.84 3.32 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Products 7.54 3.52 3.61 6.41 4.33 5.63 
Mineral Commodities 1.10 1.36 1.26 0.92 1.83 1.21 
Manufactured Commodities 9.64 5.38 4.85 5.08 4.52 4.64 
Manufactured Commodities not identified by type 5.58 2.13 2.26 3.03 2.24 2.99 
Source: UNCTAD Trains database accessed through WITS. 
Note: MFN import duties only; para-tariffs and surcharges (such as excise duties and import commission fees, which 
were applied in Uganda up to 2004) are not included.  Tariffs in 2005 are weighted with 2004 trade data. 
 
The CET has three-band structure, with a zero rate for raw materials, capital 
goods, and meritorious goods such as medical, pharmaceutical and educational 
supplies; a 10 percent rate for intermediate goods, and a 25 percent maximum rate 
for finished goods.  These 3 rates apply to about 99 percent of all tariff lines.  The 
customs union protocol provides for a revision of the top rate five years after the 
customs union entered into force (almost 40 per cent of all tariff lines are subject to 
the maximum rate).  For the remaining 1 percent of the tariff lines (falling outside 
the CET)—i.e. 58 tariff lines (for “sensitive products”) diverge from the CET— 
“special tariffs” apply, about a fifth of which are combined duties, comprising an ad 
valorem and a specific components. The ad valorem tariffs range from 35 to 
100 per cent, with the highest duties applying to sugar imports.  Sensitive products 
include sugar, milk, grains, cigarettes, kitenge, and used clothing.  For most of the 
sensitive products, the special tariffs exceed the previously existing national import 
duties. 
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Tariffs on intra-EAC trade have largely been abolished; they remain in place for 
exports from Kenya to Uganda for 443 items, and for exports from Kenya to 
Tanzania for 880 items, which are to be phased out by 2010.  The differential 
treatment in liberalizing intra-regional trade is intended to give Uganda and 
Tanzania, which have less developed industrial sectors and large trade deficits 
with Kenya, additional time for structural adjustments.  The 443 products on 
Uganda’s list are subject to import tariffs of 10 per cent that will be reduced to zero 
in five annual steps.  With this 10 per cent import duty, Kenyan exporters of listed 
products face (temporarily) higher import barriers under EAC preferences than 
they did previously under COMESA preferences. 
 
In the context of trade facilitation, Uganda has launched a comprehensive reform 
program to improve customs administration operation as part of the efforts geared 
at the modernization of Uganda Revenue Authority (URA).  The most significant 
progress has been the introduction of ASYCUDA++. Priority attention is also 
needed for issuing regulations under the EAC Customs Management Act.  
  
Other measures that would help facilitate trade include operationalization of the 
post-release audit unit (by hiring competent staff and providing relevant training); 
and implementing a risk-based approach for: (i) physical inspections of exports 
involving duty drawbacks and VAT refunds as the current system of physically 
inspecting many consignments regardless of the exporter’s compliance record is 
inefficient; (ii) in-transit bonds; and (iii) extending inland container depot and 
warehouse license periods. Attention also needs to be focused on valuation 
practices at border stations—should be reviewed to ensure effective application of 
WTO rules.  A World Customs Organization (WCO) time release study could be 
undertaken to provide diagnostic information on processing and clearance 
bottlenecks and clearance times.  Another issue to consider is formalising customs 
consultation processes with other agencies and the private sector, and 
accelerating the development and implementation of the URA integrity program. 
 
Sanitary, phyto-sanitary (SPS) and other standards 
 
Uganda faces potential risks of market access problems related to some of its 
more important exports especially fish exports to Europe, for which additional 
measures are needed to improve hygiene and safety in the fish export supply 
chain.  Such measures, including changing the policy/strategy for investment in 
landing site upgrading will help reduce the high losses of caught fish, hence 
improve the sustainability of the resource, and increase capacity utilization in the 
fish processing industry. Uganda has developed pockets of enhanced SPS/quality 
management capacity that have evolved in response to the export market 
requirements (such as for fish) or acute SPS problems (such as certain animal 
diseases), typically supported by donors.  But it lacks a broader strategy to utilize 
agro-food standards to enhance its international competitiveness and to protect 
human, plant, and animal health.      
 
Other SPS-related challenges facing Uganda’s trade include potential risks of 
mycotoxin contamination of Ugandan maize and coffee which can be minimized by 
investments, advisory services, and field testing. There is also a need to rationalize 
and improve the performance of its national network of laboratory testing facilities. 
Despite the enormous amount of development assistance geared towards 
promoting Uganda’s agro-food exports, there has only been modest success in 
fostering the development of sustainable SPS/quality management capacities. 
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Attention need to be focused on establishing a coherent and agreed-upon vision 
for promoting and managing standards to improve export competitiveness and 
increase returns to primary producers, traders, and processors.  Some incremental 
technical assistance and investment is required, but there is perhaps greater need 
for: (i) clearly prioritizing investments and other capacity-building needs; (iii) 
shifting resources towards awareness-raising and promotion of basic/good 
practices among primary producers, enterprises and regulatory agents; (iv) clearly 
defining the roles and responsibilities of different players; and (v) intensifying the 
levels of collaboration—within the private and public sectors, between them, and 
among donor agencies—in the implementation of agreed strategies and programs. 
 
Export performance  
 
Despite its liberalisation commitments, Uganda exhibits a very low level of trade 
integration as measured by the share of exports and imports of goods and services 
in GDP (Table 2).  While Uganda’s growth performance is all the more impressive 
given its low degree of trade integration, this also highlights the extent to which 
growth has hitherto been driven by domestic consumption, and in turn the need to 
shift to a more outward-oriented or export-driven growth as discussed earlier.  
 
Table 2. Trade Integration and real per capita growth (%), 1990-2004  
 
Exports of goods & 
services /GDP (%) 
Imports of goods 
& services/GDP 
(%) 
Exports and imports 
of goods & services 
/GDP (%) 
Real per capita 
GDP growth per 
annum (%) 
Developing countries 25.5 25.5 51.0 2.4 
Landlocked SSA  18.9 27.4 46.3 -0.1 
Uganda 10.8 25.3 36.2 3.5 
Sources: DTIS based on World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
Notes: Developing countries = low +middle income countries (World Bank definition); all trade/GDP ratios in current US dollar terms.  
Landlocked SSA denote landlocked sub-Saharan African countries and include Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
Uganda has made significant progress towards diversifying its exports. The export 
sector comprises the traditional and non-traditional traded commodities (Table 3). 
The traditional export commodities include coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. The 
major non–traditional exports include fish, maize, beans, sim sim, flowers, hides 
and skins, leather products, textile, yarns and fibres. Tables 3 show the trends in 
the volume of exports for major traded commodities for the period 2002 to 2007. 
Past statistics indicate a steady increase in volume of exports (and real earnings) 
over the last twenty years. Exports grew from US$ 196 million in 1991 to US$ 
478.75 million in 1999 (at an average rate of 25 percent per annum), and from US$ 
665.090 million in 2004 to US$ 1,336.7 million in 2007, representing an increase of 
10.98 percent.  
Uganda’s share in world exports increased from 0.006 percent to 0.007 percent, 
between 1990-92 and 2002-2004. Merchandise exports accelerated during the first 
half of the 1990s—quadrupling from US$176m to US$684m, between 1990/91 and 
1996/97—but fell afterwards.  Merchandise exports then stagnated for several 
years before they began to pick up in 2003/04, reaching US$786m in 2004/05 
(Table 3). 
Traditional exports largely followed the trend of coffee exports, given the 
importance of the latter (at their peak in 1994/95 coffee exports made up 97 
percent of traditional exports). Export expansion during the first half of the 1990s 
was driven by the acceleration of coffee exports, in part due to liberalization of the 
coffee sector, and the boom in international prices. 
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Table 3. Exports by value (‘000 US $), 2002 – 2005 
 
Commodity 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Traditional Exports 
    
Coffee 96,626 100,233 124,237 172,942 
Cotton 9,519 17,755 42,758 28,821 
Tea 31,293 38,314 37,258 34,274 
Tobacco  45,262 43,042 40,702 31,486 
Non-Traditional Exports 
    
Maize 10,609 13,724 17,896 21,261 
Beans and other Legumes 3,284 5,235 8,968 8,693 
Fish and Fish products 87,945 88,113 103,309 142,691 
Cattle hides 9,810 4,925 5,409 7,064 
Sesame seeds 510 2,183 2,788 4,779 
Soya beans 74 87 118 126 
Soap 3,434 5,553 7,708 7,194 
Electric Current 15,645 13,778 12,075 4,465 
Cocoa beans 2,023 7,001 6,801 9,638 
Cobalt 7,032 0 11,548 14,320 
Hoes and hand tools 385 580 348 1,159 
Pepper 111 176 368 594 
Vanilla 6,898 13,546 6,120 6,135 
Live animals 80 61 130 29 
Fruits 670 436 917 1,158 
Groundnuts 75 7 1 23 
Bananas 225 110 850 806 
Roses and Cut flowers 17,828 22,080 26,424 24,128 
Ginger 462 15  78 
Gold and gold compounds 60,342 38,446 61,233 73,072 
Other Precious Compounds 0 13,612 4,713 6 
Other products  46,714 77,193 114,507 183,935 
Petroleum products 10,749 27,901 27,904 32,015 
Traditional export  182,700 199,344 244,955 267,522 
Non-traditional exports 284,905 334,762 420,134 545,335 
Total 467,605 534,106 665,090 812,857 
 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
 
Coffee exports peaked in 1994/95 at around US$460m, making up over three-
quarters of Uganda’s total merchandise exports. Since then, coffee exports has 
fallen sharply as international prices plummeted, reaching a low of US$85m in 
2001/02 (less than 20% of the peak level reached in 1994/95). By 2004/05 the 
share of coffee exports in traditional exports was only 46 percent, while cotton, tea, 
and tobacco contributed shares of between 17 to 19 percent (cotton, tea, and 
tobacco did not suffer such a large decline in price). 
 
Exports of coffee—which had driven the high merchandise export growth in the 
first half of the 1990s—have been falling since the mid-1990s, in part due to the 
decline in international prices, but also due to the coffee wilt disease and the 
unsuccessful GOU coffee replanting program. Coffee has maintained the lead as 
the main exchange earner although with declining share to the total export 
earnings. The share of coffee in total exports declined from 20.7 percent in 2002 to 
18.7 percent in 2003, and only increased slightly to 21.3 in 2005, following 
improvements in the international coffee prices in 2005. Coffee export receipts 
increased from US $ 96.6 million in 2002 to US $ 124.2 million in 2004 and US $ 
172.9 million in 2005 – representing an increase of 79 percent between 2002 and 
2005. This is due to an increase in the realised average unit of world market price 
of coffee from US$1.0 per kg in 2004 to US$1.4 in 2005 although the export 
volume of coffee decreased from 2.5 million bags (of 60kg) in 2004 to 2.1 million 
bags in 2005. 
 
Fish and fish products is one commodity which has picked tremendously from 
the non-traditional export sector, especially since the lifting of the ban of Uganda 
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fish in the European market which led to a revenue loss of 70 percent in fish sub-
sector, between 1999 and 2000.  
 
Table 4. Uganda: Exports trends (US$m) 
 
94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 
Coffee 456.6 404.4 365.6 268.9 306.7 186.9 109.6 85.3 105.5 114.1 144.5 
Cotton 3.3 13.2 28.6 11.4 10.8 22.5 14.1 18.0 16.9 42.8 41.3 
Tea 11.8 12.5 21.3 35.6 22.7 31.9 35.9 26.9 29.5 39.3 33.1 
Tobacco -- -- 8.6 10.8 22.9 22.4 27.6 32.3 39.9 36.2 36.2 
  Sub-total 471.7 430.1 424.1 326.7 363.1 263.7 187.3 162.4 191.7 232.4 255.1 
Fish Products 17.0 37.5 34.6 28.0 47.6 24.8 66.6 107.5 111.4 118.1 169.6 
Gold 1/ -- 35.2 110.5 25.5 27.9 39.4 58.5 56.7 48.2 58.5 71.3 
Flowers -- -- 5.3 6.8 7.2 8.3 13.2 15.9 17.0 27.2 31.7 
Electricity -- -- 8.1 12.0 12.3 13.8 16.7 13.9 15.5 12.6 8.3 
Maize 20.2 9.4 16.5 8.1 6.1 4.0 6.1 13.1 8.2 18.8 13.3 
Hides & Skins -- -- 7.8 7.8 6.6 6.1 22.7 19.6 4.2 5.9 6.4 
Cobalt -- -- -- -- -- 7.3 12.8 10.9 1.9 2.7 13.7 
Beans 11.7 7.4 6.0 2.2 4.6 4.8 2.0 1.5 5.5 4.9 4.3 
Others 74.8 70.7 70.6 41.3 73.7 87.7 72.4 72.5 104.3 166.1 212.6 
Sub-total 123.6 160.2 259.4 131.7 186.0 196.2 271.0 311.6 316.2 414.8 531.2 
TOTAL 595.3 590.3 683.5 458.0 549.1 459.9 458.3 474.0 507.9 647.2 786.3 
Source: IMF. 
Note: 1/ Most of the recorded gold exports are re-exports from DRC, although there are 3 gold mines in Uganda.    
  
For over six years, now, fish is ranked second (to coffee) as a foreign exchange 
earner for Uganda. It increased from US $ 88.1 million in 2003 which increased to 
US $ 142.7 million in 2005 on account of an increase in export volumes. Average 
unit price of fish, however, remained unchanged at US$3.8 per kg in 2006.   
 
Over the last four years tea has emerged as the third main export for Uganda 
taking the place of Tobacco which now ranks fourth in the contribution to foreign 
exchange.  Export proceeds from tea and tobacco have been declining in recent 
years. Tea export receipts declined by 10.4 percent to US$34.3 million in 2005, 
from US$38.3 in 2003 due a fall in world market prices. The major outlet (market) 
for Ugandan tea is Mombasa Auction – which accounts for 80 percent of tea export 
receipts. Tex Box 1 highlights some of the non-tariff barriers affecting the sector. 
The volume of tobacco exports reached a peak level of 10,600 million tonnes in 
1998/99 at the unit price of US$ 2.16/kg in the world market (the highest price in 
the last decade). It is generally believed that the world-wide campaign against the 
tobacco industry contributed to decreased demand for tobacco products.  
 
In the fifth and sixth place in Uganda’s export ranking is cotton and flowers, 
respectively. Though these commodities were ranked in the first ten main exports 
for Uganda, their share to the export revenue have continued to decline in recent 
years. The share for cotton to total export earnings declined from 6.5 percent in 
2004 to 3.5 percent in 2005, with corresponding drop in export revenues from US $ 
42.7 million to US $ 28.8 million. That of flowers declined form 4.0 percent in 2004 
to 3.0 percent in 2005, and a corresponding fall in export earnings from US$ 26.4 
million to US$24.1 million.   
 
Table 5 shows Uganda’s major export destinations. Up to 46 percent of 
Uganda’s total exports were destined to European market in 2004.  Within Europe, 
European Union (EU) countries took nearly 30 percent of Uganda’s exports in 
2004, with Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom being the top 
destinations (Table 7). Exports to EU grew from 25 percent of total exports in 2000 
to 41.2 percent in 2005. 
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Table 5. Uganda’s exports (in ‘000 US$) by regional destination, 2000–2007 
 
Region/Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
COMESA  93,733  122,040  107,493  147,793  177,995  249,336  283,747 506,509 
o/w Kenya  62,947  59,063  61,504  78,432  76,903  72,437 88,002 118,191 
      Tanzania  5,487  6,689  5,774  5,832  12,155  15,445 13,749 30,599 
Other Africa  32,160  33,465  55,141  45,963  37,823  38,931 37,763 87,745 
o/w South Africa  28,893  24,076  42,997  29,632  9,250  9,796 10,852 10,730 
European Union  100,021  128,237  156,386  140,529  195,849  335,174 263,752 324,395 
 o/w United Kingdom  38,690  28,806  30,015  33,883  29,438  26,831 29,959 53,284 
Other Europe  102,576  75,662  73,206  79,033  110,770  82,466 49,074 91,361 
North America  9,264  8,348  10,549  14,635  18,653  18,340 16,442 23,777 
Middle East  5,971  9,898  9,138  18,489  37,421  88,111 14,211 19,593 
Asia  39,225  52,953  42,255  49,797  53,488  61,180 198,544 190,847 
South America  332  1,138  1,286  342  379  1,005 75,194 71,937 
Rest of the World  18,348  20,023  1,505  2,334  5,029  566 899 2,472 
Unknown  0  0  10,646  35,191  27,683  20,214 297 159 
Other  3,267  9,389  12,145  16,332  16,817  0 36,483 37,465 
United States  8,545  6,743  9,190  12,693  15,182  15,892 - - 
Total 401,645 451,764 467,605 534,106 665,090 812,857 962,194 1,336,668 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
 
Table 6. Uganda’s exports to different regions as share of total exports (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EAC 19.69 19.29 18.48 21.56 19.82 -- -- -- 
o/w Rwanda 2.24 3.68 2.75 3.89 3.71 -- -- -- 
   Kenya 15.67 13.07 13.15 14.68 11.56 8.91 9.15 8.84 
   Burundi 0.41 1.06 1.34 1.89 2.72 -- -- -- 
   Tanzania 1.37 1.48 1.23 1.09 1.83 1.90 1.43 2.29 
COMESA (incl. EAC) 23.34 27.01 22.99 27.67 26.76 30.67 29.49 37.89 
COMESA (excl. EAC)  3.65 7.72 4.51 6.11 6.94 19.86 18.91 26.76 
European Union 76.66 72.99 77.01 72.33 73.24 41.23 27.41 24.27 
Asia 9.77 11.72 9.04 9.32 8.04 7.53 20.63 14.28 
TOTAL            1/ 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.30 96.45 103.20 
 
Source: Uganda Revenue Authority and Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
Notes: 1/   Total for 2005 and 2006 are below 100% caused by under reporting and total for 2007 above 100% is due to double reporting 
for COMESA. 
 
  COMESA is Uganda’s second top exports destination after the EU, absorbing 
26.8 percent of Uganda’s exports in 2004. Within COMESA, Kenya is by far 
Uganda’s most important export destination, absorbing nearly 12 percent of 
Uganda’s exports and being the second most important worldwide export 
destination after Switzerland in 2004. Asia accounted for about 9 percent of total 
exports in 2005. Export to Asia as share of total exports declined from 9.8 percent 
in 2000 to 7.5 percent in 2005. 
 
Table 7. Export destinations, 2004 
By regional grouping 
(share of total exports) 
Top ten export destinations and products 
Share of total exports Top export items 
European Union 29.4% Switzerland 16.4% coffee, gold, cotton 
COMESA 26.8% Kenya 11.6% tea, electricity 
Other Europe 16.7% Netherlands 9.2% flowers, fish, coffee 
Asia 8.0% Belgium 5.2% Fish, coffee, tobacco 
Other Africa 5.7% United Arab Emirates 5.0% Gold, fish, cotton  
Middle East 5.6% United Kingdom 4.4% Coffee, cotton, survey instruments* 
North America 2.8% DRC 4.3% maize flour, metal products 
South America 0.1% Rwanda 3.7% metal products 
Rest of World 0.8% France 3.4% Fish, tobacco 
  
Sudan 3.4% Coffee, beer, cement 
 Source: 2004 Statistical Abstract, UBOS; UNCOMTRADE. 
Note: 1/ Survey instruments are re-exported items.  
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Uganda in regional trade 
 
As shown in Table 6, Uganda’s share in world exports lags behind Kenya’s (0.035 
percent) and Tanzania’s (0.014 percent). Uganda also increased its share in world 
imports from 0.012 percent in 1990-92 to 0.016 percent in 2002-2004. 
 
Table 8. Uganda’s trade performance, compared with other EAC countries  
  
 Growth rates (1990-2004), % Share in world exports (%) 
Share in world imports 
(%) 
 Exports Imports GDP 1990-92 2002-04 1990-92 2002-04 
EAC 4.4 4.5 3.5 0.066 0.059 0.110 0.109 
Kenya 2.8 5.5 1.7 0.04 0.035 0.054 0.056 
Tanzania 5.9 2.3 4.0 0.013 0.014 0.023 0.030 
Uganda 10.9 6.5 6.5 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.016 
Burundi 11.7 6.9 -0.4 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 
Rwanda -0.1 5.4 1.6 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 
COMESA 4.4 2.8 3.4 0.549 0.472 0.699 0.634 
Developing countries 8.4 7.0 3.9 18.45 31.05 18.68 28.28 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE (adopted from World Bank, 2007) 
 
Uganda accounts for only 6 percent of intra-EAC exports, but a huge 50 percent of 
intra-EAC imports (Table 9). Tanzania accounts for 9 percent of intra-EAC exports 
against 26 percent of intra-EAC imports. Kenya’s share of intra-EAC exports 
(amounting to 86 percent) is the largest in the region, and her share of intra-EAC 
imports of 4 percent is the lowest in the region. Kenya, therefore, runs a huge 
trade surplus with all the EAC countries. Uganda’s trade deficits with Kenya 
amount to over US$ 473 million and slightly over US$ 5million with Tanzania. 
Uganda’s runs a trade surplus with Rwanda and Burundi.  
 
Kenya and Tanzania have improved their trade balance in relation to GDP 
between 2004 and 2006, except Uganda. Intra-EAC trade rose by 21.2 percent 
between 2004 and 2005 and comprised 11 percent of total EAC trade. Increases in 
shares of bilateral trade (in total trade) between 2004 and 2006 are further 
indications of improved intra-trade flows in the EAC member states.  
 
Table 9. Intra-EAC trade flows and trade balances (million US$), average 2003 – 2005  
 
  Exporting countries   
 Burundi Rwanda Kenya Tanzania Uganda Total 
Importing countries       
Burundi  0.93 36.99 23.37 0.059 73.04 
Rwanda 2.99  90.45 6.85 0.035 129.38 
Kenya 0.04 0.17  24.13 0.014 38.01 
Tanzania 0.03 0.68 486.84 13.72 0.007 501.27 
Uganda 0.04 0.07 248.26  0.001 256.53 
Total 3.10 1.85 862.55 68.07 0.003 998.24 
      
   Exporting countries   
 Burundi Rwanda Kenya Tanzania Uganda Total 
Importing countries       
Burundi  -2.06 36.95 23.33 11.72 69.94 
Rwanda 2.06  90.28 6.78 28.41 127.53 
Kenya -36.95 -90.28  -224.13 -473.17 -824.54 
Tanzania -11.72 -28.41 473.17 5.56  438.60 
Uganda -23.33 -6.78 224.13  -5.56 188.46 
Total -69.94 -127.53 824.54 -188.46 -438.60  
 
Source: UN COMTRADE (adopted from World Bank, 2007) 
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Trends in imports 
 
Table 10 shows the trends in imports from 2003–2007. Available trade statistics 
show that total imports grew from US$ 522.7 million in 1991 to US$ 671.1 million in 
1999 and from US$ 1,726.1 million in 2004 to US$ 3,495.4 million in 2007. About 
25 percent of total imports originate from EAC, less than 1 percent from other 
COMESA countries (excluding EAC), and over 70 percent from rest of the world 
(mostly EU).  
 
Petroleum (petroleum products) accounts for the largest share of import bill, 
annually. Petroleum import bill increased from US$ 161.9 million in 2001 to US$ 
343.2 million in 2005, representing an increase of 50 percent.  
 
Second in share of import, are automobiles (road vehicles), which import bill 
increased from US$89.2 million in 2001 to US$ 192.2 million in 2005. Import bill 
from cereals and cereal preparations amounted to US$141.2 million in 2005. 
Import bill from iron and steel increased by 82 percent between 2003 and 2005, 
that from telecommunication equipment by 180 percent.   
 
Kenya is the largest source of Uganda’s imports, accounting for 30 percent of 
total imports, annually; Asia about 27 percent, and the EU about 20 percent. About 
7 percent of total imports come from the Middle East and 7 percent from South 
Africa. African countries accounted for 36.2 percent of the total imports expenditure 
in 2005, which means that over 60 percent of imports are still sourced from 
overseas.  
 
Table 10. Imports by SITC and value (000 US$), 2003-2007 
 
SITC   Description  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
33  Petroleum, petroleum products & related materials  187,255 217,762 343,159 526,581 645,587 
78  Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles)  115,096 144,695 192,198 216,357 294,310 
04  Cereals and cereal preparations  106,698 134,431 141,194 156,768 158,779 
67  Iron and steel  77,755 96,020 118,823 141,632 173,423 
76  Telecommunications, sound recording apparatus,   48,936 82,764 100,410 137,029 349,160 
54  Medical and pharmaceutical products  74,920 80,137 85,721 123,065 175,778 
66  Non-metallic mineral manufactures  51,862 57,269 68,576 77,815 117,535 
89  Miscellaneous manufactured articles  52,358 62,078 81,723 68,211 72,442 
57  Plastics in primary forms  28,332 43,886 62,606 70,588 96,071 
72  Machinery specialized for particular industries  40,070 59,104 60,491 66,781 101,525 
77  Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances  52,178 61,971 56,843 76,873 112,604 
75  Office machines, automatic data-processing mach  37,678 36,779 50,233 48,352 70,707 
64  Paper, paperboard, articles of paper pulp  37,660 48,513 50,098 62,131 69,127 
42  Fixed vegetable fats & oils, crude, refined, etc  39,248 45,175 46,928 68,410 103,325 
65  Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, etc  36,904 40,028 42,703 53,372 73,979 
  Others    388,156  515,626    552,431 
 
663,343 881,039 
  Total 1,375,106 1,726,238 2,054,137 2,557,308 3,495,391 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
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Table 11. Imports by region (‘000 US$), 2000 – 2007 
  
Region/Country  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 2006 2007 
COMESA  312,246  295,695  337,711  389,630  434,154  565,011 450,419 560,321 
o/wKenya  296,033  281,472  312,870  357,327  399,152  520,686 400,965 495,687 
Other Africa  76,708  82,455  84,968  101,047  160,139  177,881 188,853 242,712 
o/w S/Africa  65,915  72,850  83,665  98,984  140,749  143,676 156,272 207,191 
Asia  224,127  259,761  292,580  382,110  499,396  540,808 749,982 1,174,968 
o/w China  29,457  36,227  44,026  70,248  103,093  109,217 138,260 274,268 
European Union  185,566  198,181  183,573  243,734  314,496  387,158 481,209 717,642 
Other Europe  27,920  34,643  27,921  24,325  11,793  21,703 69,894 66,049 
Middle East  60,270  69,319  73,904  101,707  121,883  206,879 489,218 566,592 
North America  45,454  38,439  43,149  88,031  122,926  105,723 98,615 128,779 
o/w USA 30,813 28,133 35,842 78,129 103,499 78,143 89,720 100,939 
South America  8,823  7,457  2,175  5,521  26,092  31,550 11,557 32,407 
Rest of the world  17,316  20,607  27,752  38,999  35,250  17,424 17,561 5,921 
Unknown 33 - -- -- 0 0 - - 
Total  958,464 1,006,557 1,073,732 1,375,106 1,726,128 2,054,137 2,557,308 3,495,391 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
 
 
Informality  
 
In addition to the formal trade documented above, Uganda also engages in 
substantial informal trade with its neighbors as shown in Tables 12–19.  The data 
in Table 12–19 provides a clear indication that informal trade has been on the rise 
amidst trade reforms—suggesting that informality is generally not sensitive to 
reforms. 
  
Uganda’s informal exports to Kenya are mainly agricultural food commodities 
and these include maize, beans, fish, groundnuts, bananas and fruits (water 
melons, passion fruits, mangoes, oranges).  Informal cross-border trade in beans 
tops in the list of several agricultural commodities that cross from Uganda into 
Kenya at Busia border daily (Table 12), followed by maize, fish, groundnuts and 
millet.  Evidence also shows growing importance of fruit (e.g. water melon), 
vegetables and eggs into Kenya. 
 
The drop in total value of informal exports into Kenya by half between 2005 and 
2007 was more than compensated by rise in exports to Southern Sudan. The 
growth of Uganda’s informal cross border exports in beans to this new market 
(Table 14) has been astronomical (over 320-fold between 2005 and 2007. The 
leading agricultural products from Kenya into Uganda are rice and beans.  Others 
include unprocessed coffee, tuber root crops and fruits.  
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3 Theoretical frameworks 
of the trade policy 
process 
 
 
3.1 Overview  
 
Over the past one-half of a century, trade policy has noticeably dominated national 
and international public policy space as global economies become more and more 
integrated. Public policy has evolved from a narrow definition as “whatever 
governments choose to do or not to do” (Dye, 1987), or the actions or 
pronouncements of governments on particular matters, the steps they take (or fail 
to take) to implement them, and the explanations they give for what happens or 
does not happen (Wilson, 2006) to a field that has admittedly become more 
complex. The process of making policy involves an extremely complex set of 
interactions among hundreds of actors—from interest groups, civil society, 
governmental institutions, think-tanks, academia, and the media —who potentially, 
hold varying views over different issues, and with different values or interests, 
perceptions of the situation at hand, and policy preferences (Sabatier, 2007), 
involved in one or more aspects of the policy process, over time. 
  
Recent advances in theories of the policy process has opened up the 
possibility of a much more detailed understanding of the manner in which 
government policies get formulated and implemented and why governments may 
pursue particular courses of action and inaction. This section provides an overview 
of the elements of the resulting strands of literature—“stages heuristic”, institutional 
rational choice, multiple-streams framework, policy diffusion framework, 
punctuated-equilibrium (PE) framework, and the advocacy coalition framework—
drawing on the relationship between theoretical and practical aspects of policy 
making discussed in section 4. Given the number and diversity of theoretical 
perspectives, a complete review of this work is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Instead, we shall look at a handful of these closest works to ours. 
 
3.2 Policy frameworks  
 
The dominant paradigm of the policy process, the Stages Heuristic—what 
Nakamura (1987) called the “textbook approach”—first developed by Lasswell 
(1956), and popularized by Jones (1970), Anderson (1975), May and Wildavsky 
(1978), Jenkins (1978), and Brewer and deLeon (1983) considers the policy 
process as evolving through a sequence of discrete stages or phases—agenda 
setting, policy formulation and legitimation, implementation, and evaluation—and 
discusses some of the factors affecting the process within each stage. Although 
real world decision-making rarely follows this sequence of discrete stages as 
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empirical studies of decision-making and planning in organizations (such as the 
behavioral theory of decision making put forward by Simon 1947) suggests, the 
stages perspective still counts as an ideal-type of rational planning and decision-
making. The stages heuristic has served as a basic template for policy making 
especially in the 1970s and early 1980s and for understanding the contributions 
and interaction of different actors and institutions in the policy process. 
  
Framing policy making as a continuous process of interactions among actors 
allows one to assess the cumulative effects of the various actors, forces, and 
institutions that interact in the policy process and therefore shape its outcome(s). 
Transforming it into the so-called policy cycle framework, the stages heuristic 
incorporates a mechanism for the feedback between different elements, allowing 
for evaluating consequences of public policy. Taken together, one of the major 
reasons of the success and durability of the stages heuristic as Sabatier (1991) 
puts it so well, is its appeal as a normative model for rational, evidence-based 
policy making and democratic understanding of elected politicians taking decisions 
which are then carried out by a neutral public service. These virtues, 
notwithstanding, the stages heuristic has had its share of devastating criticisms 
(Nakamura 1987; Sabatier 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins- Smith 1993). The stages 
heuristic is considered to have outlived its usefulness and must be replaced 
(Sabatier 1991), in large part because it is not really a causal theory—it never 
identifies a set of causal drivers that govern the policy process within and across 
stages. Without causal drivers, there can be no coherent set of hypotheses within 
and across stages. The stages heuristic, in the eye of some policy scholars, has a 
very legalistic, top-down bias in which the focus is typically on the passage and 
implementation of a major government decision—making it a less ideal choice 
although practically relevant for understanding the policy process (e.g. the causal 
relationship between the different stages of trade policy making). 
 
Institutional Rational Choice—a family of frameworks focusing on how 
institutional rules alter the behavior of intended rational individuals motivated by 
material self-interest (Sabatier 2007)—appears the most developed framework and 
seemingly the most utilized around the world. Although much of the literature on 
institutional rational choice seems to focus on rather specific sets of institutions, 
such as the relationships between Congress and administrative agencies in the 
United States (Moe 1984; Shepsle 1989; Miller 1992), the general framework is 
extremely broad in scope and has been applied to important policy problems not 
just in the United States only, but in other countries as well (Ostrom 1986, 1990; 
Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Scholz, 
Twombley, and Headrick 1991; Chubb and Moe 1990; Dowding 1995; Scharpf 
1997).  
 
To understand the policy process, most institutional rational choice approaches 
tell us to focus on the leaders of a few critical institutions with formal decision 
making authority (Sabatier 2007). These actors—who are then grouped into a few 
institutional categories, for example, legislatures, administrative agencies, and 
interest groups (Shepsle 1989; Scharpf 1997)—are assumed to be pursuing their 
material self-interest (e.g., wealth, power, security) as also encountered in political 
economy literature. Over the past 20 years, a large group of rational choice 
scholars have found it fitting to start with individual actors—their preferences, 
interests, and resources—as the basic unit of analysis and then examine how 
institutional rules can affect behavior (March and Olsen 1984; Moe 1984; Sabatier 
1991). The key contributors to this perspective are Kiser and Ostrom (1982) who 
 16 
combines an actor-based perspective to policy process with attention to 
institutional rules, intergovernmental relations, and policy decisions. The authors 
view individual actions as a function of both the attributes (values and resources) 
of the individual and the attributes of the decision situation, which in turn, is a 
product of institutional rules, the nature of the relevant good, and the attributes of 
the community as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Ostrom's Framework for Institutional Analysis  
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Source: Adopted from Sabatier (1991) 
 
The main insight of this approach is that the same individual will behave 
differently in different decision situations (Sabatier 1991)—presenting policy 
making as a dynamic process driven by a variety of factors. The tradition has been, 
first, to develop a classification of institutional rules that delineate entry and exit to 
various positions, and consider the scope of authority for each position, including 
permissible communication among actors in various roles, and means for 
aggregating individual actions into a collective decision. Empirical and theoretical 
literature has confirmed how changes in a specific rule can significantly affect 
behavior (Ostrom 1986a, b, 1990 cited in Sabatier 1991).   
 
Institutional Rational Choice is an excellent framework for thinking about the 
effects of individuals and institutions on governmental policy decisions such as 
trade policy. The downside of Institutional Rational Choice, as Sabatier (1991) and 
others have pointed out, however, is that the role of substantive policy information, 
as well as the interactions between policy decisions and societal effects are not 
taken into account. In addition, community characteristics have noticeably been 
neglected in the work to date, apart from mere mentioning as one of the three sets 
of factors affecting a decision situation (Sabatier 1991). Moreover, the focus on 
individual behavior within specific institutions has undermined the strength of this 
framework in dealing with the multitude of institutions in a policy community. 
Despite these shortcomings, Institutional Rational Choice remains a relevant 
framework, to understand the mechanics of the policy process such as the trade 
policy.  
 
Multiple-Streams (MS) framework—developed by John Kingdon (1984) and 
based upon the “garbage can” model of organizational behavior (Cohen, March, 
and Olsen 1972)—views the policy process as comprising three unrelated streams 
of actors and processes, largely separate from each others. They include: (1) a 
problem stream comprising information about real world problems and the effects 
of past governmental interventions; (2) a policy stream (policy community) 
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composed of researchers, advocates, and other specialists who analyze problems 
and formulate possible alternatives (solutions to policy problems); and (3) a politics 
stream consisting of elections (and elected officials), legislative leadership 
contests, etc. 
  
These streams, in Kingdon’s (1984) view are independent systems operating 
independently of each other, except when a “window of opportunity” permits policy 
entrepreneurs to link the various streams. Participants drift in and out of decisions, 
making some choices more likely than others. Choice is visualized as “a garbage 
can” into which actors, who drift in and out of decisions, dump essentially unrelated 
problems and solutions (Zahariadis, 2007). 
  
Zahariadis (2007) restructured the framework into five structural elements: 
problems, policies, politics, policy windows, and policy entrepreneurs (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. The Multiple Streams Framework 
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According to Kingdon’s (1984), no one actor controls the process of choice. The 
fluctuating attendance, opportunities, and attention give the process a dynamic 
and an interactive character. People often don’t know what they want. Policy 
makers rarely make their objectives crystal clear. Quite often, time constraints 
force politicians to make decisions without having formulated precise preferences. 
Decisions are made despite, and may even be facilitated by, nontransparent 
process (Sharkansky 2002). In such an environment, jurisdictional boundaries are 
unclear, and turf battles between different departments or agencies are common 
(Zahariadis, 2007). Choices are made when the three streams are coupled or 
joined together at critical moments in time; Kingdon (1995, p.165) calls these 
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moments policy windows and defines them as fleeting opportunities for advocates 
of proposals to push their agenda forward (cited in Zahariadis 2007). Major policy 
reforms happen when "a window of opportunity" joins the three streams—in 
response to a recognized problem, the policy community develops a proposal that 
is financially and technically feasible, and politicians find it beneficial to approve it. 
Opportunity is lost when policy entrepreneurs use the wrong window to pursue 
their goals. For example, by defining bioterrorism as a security rather than a public 
health issue in U.S., policy entrepreneurs lost the opportunity to institute broad-
based reforms that would improve not only the ability to manage a terrorist 
incident, but also meet other public health needs (Avery 2004, p. 275). Windows 
are opened by compelling problems of national significance or by events in the 
political stream. The crash of an airplane, for example, brings attention to air safety 
issues (Cobb and Primo 2003). 
 
The problem stream consists of the concerns and needs that policy makers and 
citizens want addressed such as inflation, illicit trade, counterfeit goods, rising 
utility costs, government budget deficits, unemployment, a pandemic, 
environmental disasters, and so on. Policy makers find out about these concerns 
and needs through internal (and external) research and available indicators which 
allows them to compare the situations in different countries.  Some concerns come 
to be defined as problems and consequently receive more attention than others 
(Rochefort and Cobb 1994). As a range of values is normally associated with a 
particular issue, changes in specific situations may violate those values and 
therefore activate interest and attention (Zahariadis, 2007).  
 
The policy stream includes a “pool” of ideas that compete to win acceptance in 
policy networks (Zahariadis, 2007). Ideas generated by specialists in policy 
communities (networks that include bureaucrats, academics, researchers in think 
tanks, and researchers in parliament, who share a common concern in a single 
policy area such as health or environmental policy) are considered in various 
forums and forms, such as hearings, papers, and conversations. How ideas 
emerge in the policy stream and how fast they rise to point of acceptance vary 
from country to country. Only a few, out of the standing pool of idea normally get 
selected or receive serious consideration—depending on technical feasibility and 
value acceptability. Proposals that are or appear plausible (in terms 
implementation, etc), and conform to the values of policy makers have a higher 
chance of surviving this selection process (and final adoption).  
 
The politics stream consists of three elements: the national mood (issue that 
resonate with majority in the country), pressure group campaigns, and 
administrative or legislative turnover (Zahariadis, 2007). The government can tell 
or monitor changes in national mood through public opinion polls. The support or 
opposition of interest groups can also serve as indicators of consensus or dissent 
in the broader political arena. Given the stake, it acts to promote certain items on 
the agenda or, conversely, to dim the prospects of others. For instance, if many 
interest groups voice their support for deregulation, it is likely that government 
officials will hasten to include the item on the agenda. In case of conflicting views, 
which is often the case, politicians formulate an image of the balance of support 
and opposition. The perception that the balance is tilting one way or another 
directly influences the issue’s visibility or obscurity (Zahariadis, 2007). 
 
Policy entrepreneurs are individuals or corporate actors who attempt to couple the 
three streams (a role that requires persistent, but also skilled at coupling). 
Immediately at every windows of opportunity, policy entrepreneurs seize the 
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opportunity to initiate action—lest he loses the opportunity and has to wait for the 
next one to come along. They attach problems to their solutions and attempt to 
make politicians receptive to their ideas. The chances of being adopted, of any 
policy—as elaborated in Zahariadis (2007)—dramatically increase when all the 
three streams—problems, policies, and politics—are coupled in a single package. 
 
The Policy Streams Approach due to Kingdon (1984) rises beyond the rigid 
institutionalism in which many political scientists seem to confine themselves, and 
incorporates an enlarged view of policy communities. It gives a prominent role to 
substantive policy information about real world problems and the impacts of 
previous governmental interventions, while acknowledging the role of serendipity in 
the policy process. However, much like other frameworks, the Policy Streams 
approach has not been free of criticisms. First, multiple streams deals with policy 
making under conditions of ambiguity—i.e. “a state of having many ways of 
thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena” (Feldman 1989, p. 5) — 
which is a recipe for vagueness, confusion, and stress (Zahariadis, 2007). Certain 
aspects of the framework need further work (Sabatier 1991) and Jones 1987), for 
example, the conditions creating windows of opportunity need further analysis. 
Sabatier (1988) would argue that Kingdon (1984) views policy analysts and 
researchers as being too apolitical, in disregard of the role of advocacy analysis 
and creating too much gap between the "policy" and the "political" streams—which 
seems to be at odd with what happens in practice. Sabatier (1991) goes ahead to 
suggest that more attention needs to be given to bureaucracies and courts in 
implementing those reforms. Added to this is the call for more recognition of the 
intergovernmental dimension in both policy formulation and implementation if the 
framework is to be expanded to include the entire policy process. 
 
This is not all. Critics have attacked multiple streams for making a number of 
unrealistic assumptions and for under-specifying certain processes. Sabatier 
(1999, p. 267) tries to remind us that multiple streams has not generated enough 
clear, falsifiable hypotheses. MS does appear to be an argument that many 
scholars quote but few explicitly use. Mucciaroni (1992) and Bendor, Moe, and 
Shott (2001) question the appropriateness of conceptualizing independent 
streams, which according to them can be more fruitfully viewed as interdependent. 
In this manner, changes in one stream can trigger or reinforce changes in another, 
making coupling much less fortuitous and the process more purposive and 
strategic (Mucciaroni, 1992). For example, the problem of U.S. tax reform was tied 
to the supply-side tax cuts proposed by conservatives in symbolic and substantive 
ways long before Reagan’s ascend to power opened a policy window (Mucciaroni, 
1992).  
 
Although the multiple-streams framework is not always as clear and internally 
consistent as one might like, it appears to be applicable to a wide variety of policy 
arenas. MS has made some advances in mapping the belief systems of policy 
elites and analyzing the conditions under which policy-oriented learning across 
coalitions can occur and stimulated considerable interest in a number of developed 
countries (Schlager 1995) and may be applicable to a variety of policy fields in 
developing countries, including trade policy.  
 
The Policy Diffusion Framework—developed by Berry and Berry (1990, 1992) to 
explain variation in the adoption of specific policy innovations across a large 
number of states or localities—views state adoptions of policies as emulations of 
previous adoptions by other state for specific reasons. For example, states may 
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learn from one another as they use innovations perceived as successful 
elsewhere. State policymakers faced with complex problems may seek shortcuts in 
decision making as Walker (1969) hypothesizes (see also Glick and Hays 1991; 
Mooney and Lee 1995). Walker (1969) based his argument on the classic model of 
incremental decision-making (Lindblom 1965; Simon 1947).  At times, states 
emulate policies of other jurisdiction to achieve an economic advantage over other 
jurisdictions or avoid being disadvantaged. It short, economies compete with each 
other. In some cases, as Walker (1969, p. 891) has argued, states/countries are 
under pressure to conform to nationally or regionally accepted standards. Such 
pressure leads states/countries to adopt programs that have already been widely 
adopted by other states/countries. In other cases, there is “normative” pressure on 
state officials to adopt the best practices in other states. Whereas policy diffusion 
framework has thus far been utilized almost exclusively in the United States, it 
should apply to variation among countries or within regions (e.g. the European 
Union, the OECD, Africa, etc), or any other set of political systems. Rogers (1983, 
p. 5) defines diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system.” 
Recently, Mintrom and Vergari (1998) integrated this framework with the literature 
on policy networks.  
 
Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework (PE)—first developed by Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993) to explain changes in legislation—argues that policymaking in the 
United States is characterized by long periods of incremental change punctuated 
by brief periods of major policy change. The latter come about when opponents 
manage to fashion new “policy images” and exploit the multiple policy venues 
characteristic of the United States. PE has evolved to include some very 
sophisticated analyses of long-term changes in the budgets of the federal 
government (Jones, Baumgartner, and True 1998). The PE framework clearly 
meets all four criteria, at least for systems with multiple policy venues. 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)—developed by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1988, 1993)—focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions 
(within a policy subsystem)—each consisting of multiple actors from a variety of 
institutions who hold set of policy beliefs and are motivated to translate those 
beliefs into actual policy (Figure 3), albeit in a policy ecosystem characterized by 
conflicting goals, and technical disputes (Hoppe and Peterse 1993).  
 
Figure 3 presents an overview of the role of advocacy coalitions within the 
policy subsystem and the effects of two sets of factors exogenous to the 
subsystem that determine the constraints and opportunities affecting actors in the 
subsystem over time. The vast majority of policymaking as Sabatier (2007) 
explains, occurs within policy subsystems and involves negotiations among 
specialists. To understand the policy process, the ACF convinces us to assume 
that (1) belief systems are more important than institutional affiliation and (2) actors 
may be pursuing a wide variety of objectives, which must be measured empirically, 
and (3) to add researchers and journalists to the set of potentially important policy 
actors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), a view that is supported by recent 
studies, which show that researchers play an active role in policymaking processes 
(Herron et al. 2006; Zafonte and Sabatier 2004; Meijerink 2005; Weible 2005). 
 
Policy change is a function of both competition within the subsystem and events 
outside the subsystem. The actors in the subsystem strive to translate components 
of their belief systems into actual policy before their opponents can do the same. 
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However, in order to have any prospect of success, they must seek allies, share 
resources, and develop complementary strategies. 
 
Figure 3. The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
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 Source: adopted from Sabatier (2007).         
 
 
Corollary to a growing policy network literature and recognition of the link 
between interpersonal relations and human behaviour (Howlett 2002; Granoveter 
1985; Provan and Milward 1995; Schneider et al. 2003; Thatcher 1998), the ACF 
predicts that stakeholder beliefs and behavior are embedded within informal 
networks and that policymaking is structured, in part, by the networks among 
important policy participants.  
  
The ACF differs from rational choice frameworks primarily in its modeling of the 
individual (Sabatier and Schlager 2000; Schlager 1995). While rational choice 
frameworks assume individual actors rationally pursuing relatively simple material 
self-interests, the ACF believes that normative beliefs must be empirically 
determined and does not a priori preclude the possibility of altruistic behavior. ACF 
believes that scientific and technical information plays an important role in 
modifying the beliefs of policy participants. In developing countries, many 
subsystems are quite nascent because of the instability of the broader political 
system and the lack of trained personnel in the subsystem. 
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4 Trade policy process 
 
 
4.1 Overview  
 
This section discusses the various processes by which trade policy is made in 
Uganda. It offers answers to three questions: Who determines Uganda’s trade 
policy (who are the actors and how do the elements of the process combine 
together to produce policy choice)? To what extent, are the processes informed by 
the existing theories of trade policy process? Why are some economic interests 
better able to impose their preferences on trade policy than others? 
 
Borrowing from Schlager (2007), the term “process” —from “trade policymaking 
process”—“connotes temporality, an unfolding of actions, events, and decisions 
that may culminate in an authoritative decision, which, at least temporarily, binds 
all within the jurisdiction of the governing body.” In discussing the trade 
policymaking processes, therefore, we put emphasis, much more on the unfolding 
than on the authoritative decision, including the structure, context, constraints and 
dynamics of the process, as well as to the actual decisions and events that occur. 
Discussions of the policymaking process are tied to theories, which are grounded 
in a framework (Ostrom, 2007). 
 
By looking at the participation of different actors in the different aspects of the 
process section 4.3–4.4 offers insights into the inclusiveness of the trade policy 
process, particularly the role of women and women’s organisations, in shaping 
trade policy decisions, and in dialogue with power holders at national level. We 
focus on the relations between actors and not on the actors’ characteristics, and 
analyze the complex pattern of interactions of private and public sector actors in 
trade policy decision making processes. 
 
4.2 Actors in the trade policy process  
 
Trade policymaking in Uganda involves participation of several actors—the 
Ministry of Tourism, Trade, and Industry (MTTI), with other relevant ministries, and 
agencies interacting with consultative bodies, in close consultation with interest 
groups including civil society and experts in think tanks and academic institutions 
(in some cases), providing assistance through research and analysis. These 
multiple actors, from a variety of institutions pursue their goals in a coordinated and 
consultative manner, tend to mirror the advocacy coalition (ACF) tradition—put 
forward by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988, 1993). Detail accounts of the roles 
of various actors are provided in Table 12. 
  
The overall responsibility of trade policy making lies primarily with the Ministry of 
Tourism, Trade, and Industry (MTTI). However, capacity limitations in the MTTI 
have resulted in other ministries—most notably, the Ministry of Finance, Planning, 
and Economic Development (MFPED) stepping in (in most cases) and assuming 
roles in trade policy making that traditionally are MTTI’s. This has precipitated a 
vicious circle whereby MTTI finds itself in the periphery, resulting in even less 
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funding through government budget being made available to it. The MTTI is in 
charge of export/import licenses and policy coordination, particularly the activities 
of the Inter Institutional Trade Committee for Trade (IITC)—a working group which 
spearheads the country’s participation in various trade negotiations. Again, 
capacity limitations of MTTI have undermined the effectiveness of the IITC. The 
first step in addressing the capacity gap within the MTTI is implementation of the 
Functional Analysis Plan, and the completion of the draft National Trade Policy 
(NTP) that was discussed with stakeholders in October 2006.  Adoption of the NTP 
can help drive MTTI activities. One way to strengthen the IITC is to provide training 
to the IITC sub-committee members and having committee meetings chaired by 
members from outside government establishment.  Giving IITC legal status could 
also help attract donor funds for specific studies and projects.  The proposal in the 
functional analysis plan of setting up a separate liaison group (the Export Growth 
Group) should be abandoned in favour of efforts to strengthen capacity within the 
MTTI and IITC. 
 
Considering recent policy development, the general view is that trade policy 
process is increasingly becoming a crowded field. In his study of non-tariff barriers, 
Ayoki (2008) observed that, “Why some stakeholders may have the impression 
that government agencies are not coordinated arise from the fact that some 
institutions have duplicated roles or functions”. For example, in the area of food 
safety, there are currently four government agencies directly involved: 
 
 Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) 
 Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) 
 Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF), especially: 
Department of Livestock and Entomology; Department of Animal Production; 
Department of Crop Protection (DCP); Department of Fisheries Resources  
 Ministry of Health (MOH), Environmental Health Division 
 National Drugs Authority (NDA).  
 
While Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) issues are the mandate of the ministry 
of agriculture, there are instances where several government agencies are 
involved with competing roles and influences on the SPS issues (Ayoki, 2008). It 
has never been resolved, who is the lead institution on food safety issue; whether 
it falls under the ministry of agriculture, ministry of health or National Drug 
Authority. All of them struggle to exert influence in this area. Two agencies are 
directly involved with regards to standards, Uganda National Bureau of Standards 
(UNBS) with various MAAIF departments for agriculture market access, and UNBS 
with various industrial development agencies for industrial standards.  
 
A number of ministries and agencies are responsible for the management of 
trade negotiations and implementation of different trade agreements, for example, 
Ministry for East African Community Affairs (with MFPED and MTTI) on EAC; MTTI 
on COMESA; and MTTI on WTO. 
 
Gender mainstreaming has become a central part of development discourse. 
However, the current reality is that the Ministry of Gender and Social Development 
(MGSD) which is responsible for initiating and coordinating ‘gender responsive 
development’, including monitoring the formulation and implementation of ‘gender 
aware’ policies in line ministries, is not among participating institutions in trade 
policy process in Uganda (Table 12). Moreover, the link between the department of 
Gender within the MGSD and private sector organisations, including those 
promoting women welfare, is nonexistent. Even the link between Ministry of 
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Gender and other line ministries associated with trade policies are weak. These 
institutional gaps obviously have some implications for design of gender-aware 
approaches and their successful incorporation into trade policy and 
implementation. 
 
 Table 12. Major actors in the trade policy processes 
 
  
Stages 
Actors  Consultation Formulation Implementation 
The Parliament ● ● ● 
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry ● ● ● 
Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development ● ● ● 
Ministry of Foreign Affair ● ● ● 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries ● ● ● 
Ministry of Health ● ● ● 
Ministry of Justice ● ● ● 
Private Sector Foundation ●   ● 
Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry ●   ● 
Uganda Manufacturers Association ●   ● 
Civil Society ●   ● 
Research Institutions   ●    
Uganda Revenue Authority ● ● ● 
 Source: Author’s compilation based on information from MTTI, and MFPED  
 
  
Analysis at meso level shows that representation of women is very low in all the 
institutions involved in trade policies processes - ranging from zero to 20 percent. 
In the Parliament, 25.2% of the MPs are women (Parliamentary Public Relations 
Office: September 10, 2003). But women chair only two of the 12 Standing 
Committees of parliament, while other two committees have women MPs as their 
vice chairpersons. Two out of the ten Session Committees had women MPs as 
their chair; and four had female vice chairpersons. 
 
Women account for less than 25 percent of the senior managers and technical 
staff in government ministries that are responsible for formulation of exports and 
imports strategies, tax policies, and foreign exchange policy.   
 
Nevertheless, women-led organizations maintain that the recent democratic 
changes in Uganda, brought by the NRM Government has provided them a new 
space for dialogue with power holders at national level, and that government has 
become more inclusive in its decision processes. The challenge is that they are 
usually consulted late in the policy process. Their contribution is sought after the 
agenda has been set already (blue print). They are expected to operate within this 
‘blue prints’ or template. This allows them no room to bring in new idea or issues 
that are of particular concerns to them.  
 
4.3 Stages of the policy process  
 
Trade policy process in Uganda evolves through a sequence of “hazy stages”— 
the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry initiating a policy to address a problem 
that has been identified and discussed, for instance, public health risks imposed by 
influx of unregulated food imports, and deciding an appropriate policy response to 
it, and its implementation—involving a continuous process of interactions among 
actors. Theoretical explanation of this phenomenon centres on the possibility of 
rational, evidence-based policymaking, collaboration to solve complex trade-
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related problems, feedback between different aspects of the policy process, and 
tracking the status of the policy measure. Our accounts are based on the 
experience with the processes that produced the policy measures implemented in 
the past two decades—under each of the three policy tracks: multilateral, regional 
and unilateral arrangements—including abolition of import licensing requirements 
and pre-shipment inspection, liberalization of export regime, and rationalization 
and reduction of import tariffs, from a weighted average of over 30 percent in 1987 
to 13.5 percent in 2005. Mesh 
 
These processes do not evolve in a pattern of clear-cut sequences; instead, the 
stages are constantly meshed and entangled in an ongoing process. A problem 
(e.g. limited access to essential commodities due to increased cost of imports, 
caused by regulatory requirements, etc) is identified by actors in- and/or outside 
government. The problem is discussed in various forums, with (in some cases) 
experts in think tanks and academia, providing assistance through research and 
analysis. Ideas and recommendations emerging from these forums are 
synthesized into a policy proposal and shared with key stakeholders for comments 
and inputs, and in preparation for further discussions. You may call this stage, 
“initiating a policy”. However, Uganda also participates in different negotiations—
under regional and multilateral frameworks. Each category poses different 
demands and challenges and thus determines the scope of consultation. Series of 
consultations have taken place to develop trade positions and secure beneficial 
trade deals in regional agreement (e.g. recent EAC Customs Union), and to 
respond to the requirements of various international agreements e.g. EAC, 
COMESA, and WTO. 
  
The scope of the consultation depends on the issue at hand. Past consultations 
have largely involved members of the Inter Institutional Trade Committee (Table 
13), selected civil society organisations, a few politicians and experts in the field. In 
principle, the process is participatory and emphasises “citizen’s ownership” on an 
understanding that successful policies need to have the citizen’s “participation”—
not only the support of the “key stakeholders”, but also a broad consensus within 
the population—to be effectively implemented. Government is aware; policies 
imposed from the outside without participation of the groups affected by it, would 
be circumvented, may induce resentment, and would not withstand the vicissitudes 
of the political process. However, the traditional structure of policy consultation has 
evolved; increasingly, issues that dominate national discussions today seem to 
originate from Arusha and Geneva. This top–down phenomenon has created 
uneasiness in the broader public; that government is giving up some of its political 
and economic autonomy needed to pursue the course of our development. 
However, government is confident that the process is robust and that its response 
is informed by evidence on weighing the balance between the negative 
consequences and the opportunities that may come from the policy proposal, 
whether it originates from EAC, COMESA, Geneva or Kampala. 
  
Consultations are complete and the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (in 
consultation with the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
and sometimes, the President’s Office) formulate alternatives and select policy 
solutions; and those solutions get implemented after the Cabinet’s approval. From 
this stage, much of the work takes place out of the public eye. The policy proposal 
is approved by Cabinet and the policy is published and ready for implementation. 
Under special circumstances a policy may be subject to a legislative process by 
Parliament. For example, policy with a tax component has to come to parliament 
either as a Bill, a budget speech or a statutory instrument, and laid before 
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parliament for days. The same applies to ratification of international agreement. In 
principle, all domestic measures or aspect of trade policy are framed in line with 
the EAC, COMESA and WTO Agreements, and it is the duty of the Ministry of 
Tourism, Trade and Industry and the Office of the Attorney General to ensure the 
consistency and coherence between domestic legislation and these international 
Agreements. 
 
Returning to the question raised in the Introduction (Do institutions outside 
government matter for trade policy in Uganda?), one can conclude that they do, 
but not all of them. A few influential groups (e.g. members of Uganda 
Manufacturers Association) are known to have close links with policy makers, and 
to have influenced tariff policy in the EAC (under the Customs Union Protocol), 
including some aspects of corporate taxes. In some instances, government (acting 
unilaterally or under influence of donors) has pushed policy through without 
consulting the public or relevant stakeholders, or it does, the policy is introduced 
even if it is not widely supported. A case in point is the idea leading to privatization 
of state enterprises and public utility services tax, which can be traced to the door 
step of the World Bank, and the introduction of 7% excise tax on air time, and 
subsequently 10%, which can be traced to the door step of the IMF.  
 
Given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the gap between theories 
of the policy process (see Section 3) and actual trade policymaking is apparent. 
Although the new narrative of a participatory process (involving wider section of the 
public) seems appealing from the public eye, this has rarely, if at all, shaped the 
outcomes of the trade policy process in recent years. We find no evidence to 
suggest that these stakeholders drive major policy changes, formulation of new 
policies, or in contextual analysis of the impact of various commitments. 
 
 
4.4 Periodic policy review and consultation  
 
Uganda does not have statutory independent advisory or review bodies, which 
specifically handle economic and trade policies. The Presidential Economic 
Council (PEC), together with the Uganda Manufacturer’s Association (UMA), the 
Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UNCCI), and other industry 
associations and relevant line Ministries carry out periodic reviews jointly. The PEC 
in conjunction with UMA annually holds a forum on strategic management, 
investment promotion and export growth, whose recommendations are used to 
inform policies. The forum brings together Cabinet Ministers, top policymakers in 
Government and private sector operators, and academia. 
  
The Private Sector Foundation (PSF), association of industry and Government 
agencies involved in trade and investment policies, co-ordinates activities of the 
forum sub-committees.  The PSF uses this opportunity to, also review how 
particular aspect of policy (e.g. in the national budget) is going to impact the private 
sector. 
 
4.5 Machinery for trade policy consultation  
  
A working group—Inter Institutional Committee for Trade (IITC)—set up by the 
Ministry of Tourism Trade and Industry (MTTI) coordinates the implementation of 
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multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) particularly the WTO agreements, and helps 
in the preparation for future trade negotiations. Originally, IITC was to deal with the 
various WTO obligations and issues facing Uganda as a member of the WTO, but 
it now works operates as coordination and dialog institution for all trade policy 
matters. The IITC covers both the functions of inter-ministerial co-ordination, and 
dialogue and consultation with stakeholders, particularly the private sector. 
     
The main IITC committee is large, consisting of 50-60 members, coming from 
about 25 organizations (Table 13), including about 5 government ministries; and 7 
autonomous bodies (Bank of Uganda, Civil Aviation Authority, Law Reform 
Commission, Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics and Export Promotion Board); 5 civil society organizations; 2 
business associations; and a media organization. 
 
Table 13. Representation on the Inter Institutional Trade Committee  
 
Institutions Male Female Total 
Ministry of Tourism, Trade & Industry 7 1 8 
Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development 2 0 2 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal & Fisheries 0 1 1 
Ministry of Justice and Uganda Law Reform Commission 2 0 2 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1 0 1 
Uganda Revenue Authority 2 0 2 
Uganda Export Promotion Board 0 2 2 
Uganda Investment Authority 1 0 1 
Uganda National Bureau of Standards 0 1 1 
Bank of Uganda 1 0 1 
National Agricultural Research Organisation 1 0 1 
National Environment Management Authority 0 1 1 
Makerere University Business School 1 0 1 
Makerere Law school 0 1 1 
Civil Aviation Authority 1 0 1 
Law Development Centre 1 0 1 
Private Sector Foundation 3 2 5 
Uganda Manufacturers Association 1 1 2 
Uganda Service Exporters Association 1 0 1 
Civil Society 2 2 4 
Uganda Law Society  1 1 2 
Network of Trainers 2 0 2 
The Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture 1 0 1 
Members of Parliament 3 0 3 
Total 34 13 47 
Percentage representation 72.3 27.7 100 
 
 
The Permanent Secretary of MTTI chairs IITC. However, the real work of the 
IITC is done by sub-committees, which focus on specific contemporary issues (of 
interest), and are generally of a more manageable size. There is an effort to give 
IITC full legal status which would apparently make it easier for donor funds to be 
utilized directly in support of its activities. According to the IITC Bill, tabled by MTTI 
to Parliament, IITC is coordinated by the MTTI, and is set to perform the following 
functions: 
  
(a)  undertake all trade negotiations and handle all issues relating to trade at 
national, regional, bilateral level; 
(b) assist and advice the Minister on the World Trade Organisation issues; 
(c) facilitate and sustain awareness of the impact of the World Trade 
Organisation and globalization on the national and regional economies; 
(d) promote market access opportunities under bilateral, regional and multilateral 
trading systems; 
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(e) carry out research and disseminate research findings on trade and trade 
related issues through seminars, workshops and publications; 
(f) develop trade policy on national, regional and international trade and advice 
government on harmonizing these with political and socio-economic 
integration activities; 
(g) to advise and act on matters of disputes related to the agreements or arising 
out of the proposed WTO Implementation Act to be enacted by parliament; 
(h) ensure expedient understanding and implementation of international 
obligations arising from trade agreements. 
 
The main channel of introducing the recommended policies is through the IITC. 
However, private sector respondents were doubtful as to the degree to which IITC 
deliberations actually leads to real changes in government policy positions, which 
dampens their (private sector) enthusiasm in participating in IITC. 
Under IITC is the National Development Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF). The 
objective of the NDTPF is to develop a group of people with particular areas of 
expertise who can participate in negotiations at the detail level as required.  This 
expertise will be needed in the forthcoming EPA negotiations with the EU. The 
Ministry of Tourism Trade and Industry (MTTI) is responsible for taking forward 
advice generated from IITC within the government system. However, the 
effectiveness of the IITC is undermined by the inherent capacity weaknesses and 
limited budget within MTTI. Until recently, the capacity weakness within MTTI had 
worked to undermine its representation and voice in shaping policy and public 
debate, including national economic development priorities. But this is beginning to 
change. MTTI’s contribution featured in the revised PEAP. Within the context of 
overall national policy (planning) framework, trade features in 2 of 5 pillars of the 
PEAP.  
 
4.6 Gender representation on policy 
subsystems 
  
With poor representation on IITC of women (Table 13), the view from 
representatives from women-owned organisations is that women may be 
marginalized in the WTO issues. About half of the organizations on the IITC have 
had only male counterparts (since 2001), while 20 percent of the organizations 
have been sending only women to IITC meetings. Opportunity for integrating 
women’s voice and women’s perspectives into the trade policy process especially 
that pertains to multilateral negotiations may be limited by the gender imbalances 
on the IITC representations. Within the IITC are six sub-committees: sub-
committee on Agriculture; Treaties and Health; Trade Remedies and Facilities; 
Trade in Services; New Issues; and Trade Investment and Technical Transfer. One 
committee that is not directly part of the IITC is that concerned with COMESA 
issues.  
   
Considering the representation in various COMESA meetings between 2001 
and early 2002 (Table 14), it is easy to see that there were 60% more men in these 
meetings than women (i.e. 10 women compared to 40 men participated in the 
meetings).  Similarly, three of the four delegates to Geneva (WTO) in 2002 were 
men. The same applies to the experts committee on Rules of Origin, which was 
dominated by men. 
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Table 14. Gender Representation on COMESA Committee Meetings, 2001 - early 2002 
and the WTO negotiating team to Geneva  
 
Uganda’s delegates on COMESA Committees Number of: 
 
Venue/Year 
Male Female Total 
Trade and Customs Committee 1 1 2 Lusaka: Zambia (2001) 
Council of Ministers 12 4 16 Cairo: Egypt (2001) 
Steering Committee on Safeguards & Remedial Measures  1 0 1 Lusaka: Zambia (2001) 
Inter Governmental Committee 3 2 5 Cairo: Egypt (2001) 
Working of Experts on Rules of Origin 2 0 2 Lusaka: Zambia (2001) 
Committee of Central Bank Governors 9 0 9 Kampala: Uganda (2001) 
Ministers of Justices & Attorney Generals  1 0 1 Lusaka: Zambia (2001) 
Inter Median Trade Committee  3 1 4 Kampala: Uganda (2001) 
COMESA Gender Policy 1/ 4 2 6 Kampala: Uganda (2002) 
World Trade Organization  4 0 4 Geneva, Switzerland (2002) 
Total 40 10 50 
 
Percentage 80 20 100  
1/
  This was a workshop conducted in Kampala aimed at equipping participants with skills of identifying and 
addressing gender concerns when undertaking development policy decisions. Participants were drawn from 
all COMESA member countries and over ten women in total attended the workshop. Two women from 
Uganda were chosen to represent Uganda in another COMESA Gender Policy workshop, which took place in 
Zambia July 2002. 
 
The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development that is expected to 
champion gender mainstreaming in sector policies is not represented on the IITC. 
The key ministry, MTTI, has had a single woman on the IITC, compared to 10 men. 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; and Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, did not have a 
female representative on their IITC team. On average, about 22 percent of those 
who participated in IITC meetings between 2001 and 2003 were women. In 
addition, men dominated the committee on gender policy where we would expect 
to see a more balanced representation. All the nine Ugandan participants at the 
Central Bank Governors forum were men.  
 
However, members of the IITC interviewed, seem to hold the view that despite 
the imbalances on the IITC representation, IITC pays equal attention to issues 
affecting men and women. They argued that ‘numbers do not really matter’ but 
ability to speak does. One of the participants commented, “one bad thing with most 
people is that, they want to see that every committee has equal number of women 
and men; but this is not the point; it may not happen anyway… For us, we have 
relatively fewer women in our sub-committee, but I have realised that in many 
meetings, women tend to dominate the discussions” (IITC member, MTTI).  
 
We also considered the composition of the Cabinet (and key decision making in 
ministries). The representation of women is highest in junior ranks—Ministers of 
State. In June 2002, women occupied 17.4% of the Uganda Cabinet posts and 
27.3% of the positions of the State Ministers. Women make up less than 20% of 
the number of decision makers in government ministries. We define decision 
makers as officers from the rank of Head of Department (Commissioners or 
Deputy Commissioners) to Directors, Under-secretaries, and Permanent 
Secretaries. 
We further considered gender composition of personnel in senior level positions 
in key line ministries working on trade policy issues: The Ministry of Tourism, Trade 
and Industry (MTTI); the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
(MFPED); as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affair; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries; and Ministry of Health. The MTTI is 
responsible for formulation of tourism, trade and Industrial policies; covering trade 
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facilitation and export diversification; schemes; import and export licensing; 
industrial development; international trade negotiations and consumer protection 
through quality control; conservation of natural resources and cultural heritage. 
The MTTI is responsible for initiating, coordinating and monitoring the formulation 
and implementation of trade policies and programmes - in consultation with 
relevant line ministries. The MTTI also chairs the Inter Institutional Committee for 
Trade (IIC). The department within the ministry, which is directly responsible for 
trade issues, is the Department of Trade. There are three other departments: 
department of industry, tourism and wildlife antiquities that are not directly 
concerned with trade and trade policies.  The department of trade had a total of 
sixteen employees (i.e. 16.7 percent of the total employee of the ministry) by end 
of December 2002. The rest (eighty members of staff of the ministry) were working 
in the department of industry, tourism and wildlife antiquities. Out of the sixteen 
employed in the department of trade, only three (18.8 percent) were women – with 
only one woman in senior position. Out of thirteen male employees, four of them 
were in senior level position. With this imbalance, it is easy to think that the interest 
of women may not be well articulated in such environment where women’s 
participation is almost non-existent. 
   
One aspect that could strengthen gender position in a similar environment is to 
have a gender desk. A Gender Focal Point or Gender Desk would help with gender 
mainstreaming policy through the design and implementation of specific policies in 
the ministry, and measuring their outcomes. Although government has in the past 
emphasized the need to create a Gender Desk in every ministry, this has rarely 
been followed. The existence of a gender desk is seen as a way to improve 
communication flows with Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development for 
successful implementation of the national gender policy.     
 
The role of Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), 
as it is specified in the constitution is to manage and control public finances in a 
prudent and sustainable manner, to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of all 
public spending. The MFPED is also responsible for ensuring gender-responsive 
budgeting and development (i.e. to ensure that available resources are directed to 
gender responsive programmes and institutions dedicated to women affairs).2 The 
MFPED is further mandated to oversee the planning of national strategic 
development initiatives - in order to facilitate economic growth, efficiency, stability, 
and eradication of poverty and enhance overall development. Other responsibilities 
include managing the economic activities of the country through fiscal and 
monetary policies so as to ensure sustainable economic growth, price stability, 
increased level of employment, and a fair distribution of income.3 The MFPED is 
represented on the IITC. The Tax Policy Department of the MFPED prepares 
proposals for tariffs and tax changes (every year) and incorporates them in annual 
national budget, which is presented to cabinet and parliament (in form of Finance 
Bill) for approval. The Tax Policy Department had 13 officers (technical staff) by 
end of September 2003, 11 men and 2 women. 
   
A meaningful gender mainstreaming in policy process requires the availability of 
detailed gender-disaggregated and reliable data, and the availability of trained staff 
to undertake analysis to inform gender-based policies. The Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics (UBOS) is mandated by an Act of Parliament to perform this function. 
UBOS collects information needed for economic management and planning. This 
                                                 
2
 The National Gender Policy, Ministry of Gender and Community Development, page 9. 
3
 Ministerial Policy Statement to the Parliament for the Financial Year 1999/2000 
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involves collecting and analyzing data, publication of statistical information, 
creation and regular updating of a national database on the economy in general for 
use by both government and the general public. Despite the magnitude of 
resources available, data is still lacking on women’s participation in the economy 
(sex disaggregated data). Use of available data in gender analysis is limited 
because most of the data are not segregated by gender. Gender segregated 
figures for trade impacts are still missing. Specific quantitative and qualitative 
impacts on women are also scarce.  
 
Finally, we want to mention that close consultation with the business community 
(private sector) has been a key factor in the re-orientation of Uganda’s trade policy. 
The private sector has continued to enjoy respect of the Government, which is 
supportive of its (private sector) participation in the policy formulation. Government 
main contacts to the business communities are through the Private Sector 
Foundation (PSF)4 and Uganda Manufactures Association (UMA). The two 
umbrella organisations for the private sector (UMA and PSF) have evolved into key 
institutions in representing the interest of their members –in policy dialogue, 
negotiating for fair taxes, and curbing malt practices such as smuggling. In 1991, 
UMA spearheaded the setting up of the Presidential Economic Council (PEC).  The 
Forum is chaired by the vice president and includes key policymakers and the 
private sector. Another regular engagement between government and the private 
sector occurs in the national budget process. 
  
The UMA and PSF have actively involved their members in this budget process. 
Their contribution has been well received by Government. There is strong 
evidence of lobbying during the budget process particularly issues related to 
taxation. The level of trust seems to grow with time. In September 2001, the PSF 
organized and managed (on behalf of government) the SMART dialogue in 
Munyonyo – Kampala, which 14 Heads of States and governments in developing 
countries attended. 
 
Table 15. Business Associations: who has more influence in trade policy process? 
 Organizations representing different commercial interest Rank 
Private Sector Foundation 1 
Uganda Manufacturers Association 1 
Uganda National Chamber of Commerce 2 
Uganda Clearing and Forwarding Agents Association 2 
Uganda National Farmers’ Federation 2 
Horticulture Association 3 
Uganda Fish Processors and Exporter Association 2 
Uganda Flowers Exporters’ Association 3 
Sector Association 1 
 
  
                                                 
4
 The responsibility of the PSF is to facilitate businesses become effective players in international trade by 
dissemination of information, commissioning research and fostering debate on key issues in the WTO, COMESA, EAC, 
Cotonou Agreements, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Present the concerns and positions of the 
private sector on trade policy to government to ensure that the business community benefits from international and 
regional trading arrangements. 
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5 Conclusions and 
implications for policy   
 
This paper explores how the existing theories of trade policy process have 
informed recent trade policy development in Uganda, and analyses the role of 
institutions in trade policymaking. There have been significant attempts to involve 
several stakeholders in the policy process, including women’s organization as 
shown by diverse representation from government institutions, private sector and 
civil society organisations. However, their chance to influence policies is limited as 
evident by poor representation of women in those organisations. The gender 
balance of the institutions at the centre and those on the periphery of the policy 
process largely favours men. While the national machinery for trade policy 
consultation and formulation has made some in-roads in ensuring the participation 
of women, in practice the point of entry for women organizations fall outside key 
points of influence in the policy dialogue. Additional evidence is based on the 
observation that organisations biased towards women issues are not part of the 
policy dialogue (not in the IITC or national consultative groups), but have to work 
through other (affiliates) organisations that represent them on these forums.  
This illustrates both the institutional and analytical gaps which need to be 
bridged if more gender-base approaches are to be successfully incorporated into 
trade policy and practice. It is important to involve stakeholders, right from initial 
stages of policy development and to take their views into account. The presence of 
women in decision-making (e.g. sizable number of women in parliament: over 
20%) is not enough to guarantee that gender perspectives will be built in but it is 
an important step. They can help lobby for more gender-oriented policies. There is 
need to enhance participation of civil society organisations especially those that 
were set up to purely work on women related issues. In addition, it is important to 
make use of the periodic policy reviews including WTO reviews for Uganda, and 
sectors reviews done jointly with all stakeholders including donors, to influence 
trade policies.  
Finally, in line with the recommendations of the Beijing Platform of Action, there 
is a need to engender the design and formulation of trade policies as well as 
gender mainstreaming and capacity building in trade ministries. The gender 
implications of all issues under negotiation should be fully assessed and discussed 
within regional and multilateral trade negotiations. Gender mainstreaming in trade 
policy formulation requires deeper and conceptualised understandings of the 
interactions between gender inequalities, class-based inequalities and poverty on 
one hand, and trade policies and trade performance on the other. This calls for 
strengthening the capacity of the MTTI. 
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Appendix  
Informal cross-border trade  
Table 16. Trend in Uganda’s informal agricultural export to Kenya through Busia (US$) 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2007 
Beans       29,363,861.65             16,349,532.36         6,633,740.87  
Maize       22,740,263.86             14,969,032.87         6,512,703.49  
Fish         5,967,641.00             10,518,469.52         6,457,139.93  
Groundnuts         2,794,080.86              4,535,908.82         4,450,939.02  
Millet         3,230,721.19              2,223,930.94         3,567,249.14  
Vegetables (Tomatoes)                 6,426.86              2,049,083.54         1,852,729.71  
Eggs            756,644.12              1,031,766.85         1,461,109.50  
Water Melons            291,539.68                              -          1,369,854.02  
Others         3,949,920.81            2,874,570.59         6,022,831.70  
GROSS TOTAL     69,101,100.03          54,552,295.49       38,328,297.38  
Source: Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
We see a dramatic decline in overall flow of food into Uganda, between 2006 and 2007, in particular rice and fish; attributed partly to 
shift of exports to other markets (such as Southern Sudan) and part of the global trends where agricultural food production generally 
declined in 2007 which culminated into 2008 food crisis.    
 
Table 17. Trend in Kenya’s informal agricultural export to Uganda through Busia (US$) 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2007 
Rice          98,641.35        3,164,114.21           746,325.15  
Coffee (Unprocessed)*        365,529.86           979,802.43           336,301.52  
Peas          55,374.22           102,413.44           275,468.12  
Root crop (Potatoes)        130,874.29           249,626.58           243,117.90  
Maize          50,239.43               2,491.11           120,263.97  
Fish          27,892.81           388,662.71             62,913.97  
Beans          10,396.87        1,231,486.75             36,963.72  
Passion Fruits        245,258.16             74,092.59             29,460.16  
Others        182,668.00           248,003.27           309,539.08  
GROSS TOTAL     1,166,874.99        6,440,693.09        2,160,353.59  
Source: Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
*Unprocessed. The main fruits include bananas, ripe bogoya, apple bananas, pineapples, water melon, cabbage and pumpkins, 
oranges, lemons, mangoes and tomatoes while the main vegetables include greens especially sukuma wiki (cordies).   
 
Table 18. Uganda’s informal agricultural export to Southern Sudan through Oraba (US$) 
 
 2005                      2006  2007 
Fish              688,267.89             875,562.48          18,537,472.14  
Onions              160,854.86                              -              6,406,531.83  
Beans              146,380.42               88,699.33            4,687,165.82  
Chicken               11,751.21                    42,925            2,532,402.28  
Cattle                 9,086.64                    27,765            2,467,518.53  
Bananas               12,351.02             111,469.87            2,386,751.46  
Root crops (Potatoes)               91,787.35               54,436.35            2,366,840.24  
Tomatoes               21,017.08  8414.43           2,346,820.39  
Others            471,499.42             454,045.98          15,378,895.35  
Gross Total         1,612,995.89          1,663,318.14          57,110,398.04  
Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
 
Table 19. Trend in Sudan’s informal agricultural export to Uganda through Oraba (US$) 
                   2005  2006 2007 
Hides & Skins             18,909.68           135,825.54               93,324.4  
Tobacco              1,963.62                          -                 51,377.4  
Beef                        -                    771.85               34,188.6  
Ground Nuts           296,794.28             32,993.63               30,402.2  
Rice                 405.08               4,147.12               24,676.2  
Meat              1,135.86                          -                 22,573.9  
Goats             23,651.92             12,318.89               18,609.0  
Beans              2,722.72             12,260.09               15,695.3  
Others           76,723.11             54,684.50               70,959.0  
GROSS TOTAL         422,306.27           253,001.62             361,805.9  
Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
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Table 20 Uganda’s informal agricultural export to Tanzania through Mutukula (US$) 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2007 
Beans               80,958.88                 800,327.29              1,396,358.8  
Maize              644,329.20              5,771,861.22              1,228,722.0  
Bananas                 2,472.80                   41,624.95                 340,842.4  
Millet                          -                           7,400                 125,681.8  
Eggs                 3,802.57                   19,141.69                 105,450.4  
Sorghum                          -                               48                   57,981.4  
Groundnuts                       3.03                 154,766.65                   45,895.2  
Coffee                     37.28                   57,863.05                   36,834.8  
Others                5,704.60                      50,415                   85,165.9  
GROSS TOTAL            737,308.36              6,903,447.9              3,422,932.6  
 Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
 
Table 21. Tanzania’s informal agricultural export to Uganda through Mutukula (US$) 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2007 
Coffee (Unprocessed)                     360                919,663             498,901.8  
Beans                 12,705                568,747             250,009.3  
Fish                   2,471                128,506             187,329.4  
Rice                196,087                395,998             123,745.8  
Meat                     212                  58,534               45,465.5  
Peas                        -                  761,543               41,424.4  
Bananas                 14,816                  79,838               35,731.9  
Milk (Fresh)                        -                    30,230               19,909.0  
Others                  6,801                125,973               95,687.2  
GROSS TOTAL           233,451.8          3,069,031.6          1,298,204.3  
 Author’s compilation based on UBOS data 
 
Table 22 Trend in Uganda’s informal agricultural export to Rwanda through Katuna (US$) 
 
 2005 2006 2007 
Maize              289,363.51              1,142,373.71            3,883,483.81  
Beans              150,020.42                 973,544.50            1,006,246.21  
Potatoes (Irish)              755,656.52                              -                 947,075.25  
Bananas              325,506.09                 272,280.61               655,456.54  
Tobacco              337,916.77                 459,401.76               600,985.58  
Sorghum                  8,480.0                    4,077.63               147,294.54  
Pineapple                  6,961.8                           7.80               139,778.68  
Apples                  8,878.1                              -                 131,256.81  
Others              262,317.7                    393,634               387,144.94  
GROSS TOTAL         2,145,100.84            3,245,320.43            7,898,722.36  
Note: According to Key informant interviews, maize flour and wheat flour are the leading commodities 
from Uganda to Rwanda, followed by Irish potatoes and bananas. 
 
Table 23. Rwanda’s informal agricultural export to Uganda through Katuna (US$) 
 2005 2006 2007 
Peas           123,103.71                147,368               70,393.3  
Passion Fruits           109,167.19                211,665               63,184.8  
Ovacadoes             13,678.34                  20,000               37,784.9  
Onions                       21                  12,645               32,817.6  
Chicken                 52,607                          -                 27,761.5  
Berries                        -                            -                 15,763.6  
Egg Plants                   1,528                          -                   8,815.0  
Cabbages                     390                          -                   4,217.7  
Others                12,346                    8,840               12,433.8  
GROSS TOTAL           312,841.3             400,518.6             273,172.2  
 
Author’s compilation based on UBOS data base 
 
